
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U.S. Department of Hoscidand Scenity 20 Mass, Rm. A3042, 425 I Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20536





U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

FILE:

Office: PHOENIX, ARIZONA

Date: FEB 12 2004

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office **DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Interim District Director, Phoenix, AZ. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for willful misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to procure admission into the United States. He married a U.S. citizen on March 28, 1997 and is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his spouse.

The Interim District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The application was denied accordingly. See Interim District Director Decision dated April 29, 2003.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security, [Secretary]) may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

After reviewing the amendments to the Act regarding fraud and misrepresentation and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

The record reflects and the applicant confirmed that on August 3, 1995 he attempted to procure admission into the United States by falsely representing himself to be a U.S. citizen to Border Patrol Agents at a checkpoint near Salton, City, CA. He supported his claim by presenting a valid United States birth certificate that did not belong to him. By making a false claim to U.S. citizenship the applicant is inadmissable under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the

determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse.

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Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extend of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

There are no laws that require the applicant's spouse to leave the United States and live abroad. In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more that to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

As mentioned, section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. Congress specifically did not mention extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident child. The assertions regarding the hardship of applicant's U.S. citizen children would suffer will thus not be considered.

The statement of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to section 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 213a, the person who files an application for an immigration visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable on behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support on behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

In his brief counsel refers to *Matter of Recinas*, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), in which a single mother was granted cancellation of removal under Section 240A(b) due to exceptional and extreme hardship which would be imposed on her U.S. citizen children if she was removed to Mexico. This is not the case in these proceedings; therefore his argument is not persuasive.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.